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INTRODUCTION
Although there are many articles written on the subject of union
"democracy, " there seens to be no consensus of opinion on what this "democra-
cy" in unions is supposed to entail. For example, Reynolds (7) stated that
"...trade-unions are probably more democratic than any other economic organi-
zation in our society." Vclie (15), deplored what he called union "dictator-
ship," inquires: "Where is their (union members') voice? It has been cholced
by dictatorship...union citizens are losing rights to which they were born a3
free Americans."
These assertions are illustrative of the confusion which exists in
respect to the problem of union "democracy." It is the purpose of this
report to attempt to describe certain minimum requirements of an acceptable
union "democracy," and then to attempt to determine whether the studies of
this question have been sufficiently exhaustive, and have been of sufficient
scope, to support a definitive judgement as to whether the majority of U. S.
unions either are or are not "democratic."
Other related questions to be answered include: Are there any particular
reasons why labor unions should be expected to be "democratic"? Is the federal
government helping to foster "democratic" procedures in labor unions through
the regulation of internal union affairs?^ And finally, if it is concluded
that unions should be "democratic," what are the prospects for promoting
more "democracy" in unions? Should the promotion of "democratic" procedures
in labor unions come primarily from within via the actions of individual
union members, or from without via federal and state regulation?
Present-day U. S. unionism consists of 138 internationals in the AFL-
CIO, with 60,000 locals and a total combined membership of 16.1 million
members, and 57 independent international unions, with 15,000 locals and
1.8 million members. There is, however, rarked concentration because 124. of
these unions have fever than 50,000 members each and account for a combined
membership of only slightly more than one and one-half million members. In
contrast, six unions, each with more than 500,000 members, represent an
aggregate of nearly six million members or one-third of all union members
(Paschell 6).
The distribution of unions by number of locals have characteristics
similar to the distribution by membership, that is to say, a few unions
with a large number of locals account for the majority of locals. Of the
estimated 60,000 local unions affiliated with the 133 internationals in the
A.F.L.-C.I.0., 19 unions have approximately 40,000 locals, or more than half
of all locals; 80 unions, each with less than 100 locals, have slightly more
than 3,000 locals, or only four per cent of the total (Paschell 6).
There is an important relationship between the structure of the U. S.
labor movement and the problem of determining whether a majority of labor
unions either are or are not "democratic." The importance of this relation-
ship is exemplified by the fact that more than a majority of union members
are concentrated in only six unions. Thus if all the 124 unions, with a
total membership of only 1} million, are found to be "democratic," this would
be a "majority of unions," but would include only 9.4. per cent of total union
membership. It is not enough that "most unions" are "democratic" (or "un-
democratic"); these must also exercise jurisdiction over a numerical majority
of union members.
The enactment of the Taft-Hartley amendments to the National Labor
Relations Act in 1947 marked the first attempt by Congress to regulate the
internal affairs of unions. Some of the essentials for an acceptable union
"democracy' which \jere unprotected by law prior to the Taft-Hartley Act be-
came protected when it va3 passed. Thus some of the pre-1947 "undemocratic"
practices of unions are now proscribed, and have lost much of their signifi-
cance.
Very few studies since that date have attempted a comprehensive as-
sessment of the changes in internal union government occasioned by the Labor
Management Relations Act of 194-7. Such a study is certainly warranted,
but is outside the scope of the present effort, which is concerned with
pre
-1947 union "democracy." A separate chapter will be devoted to the pro-
visions of the Taft-Hartley Act impinging on internal union affairs, and an
effort will be made to suggest the likely weight of this impact, but no
emperical verification is attempted.
THE ESSENTIALS OF UNION F5H0CRACY
Democracy is best defined in terms of the rights guaranteed to indivi-
duals as members of the' group. Union democracy is best measured by the rights
guaranteed individual workers within the union. The recognition of three
basic rights of individual workers seems to represent the minimum essential
of an acceptable union democracy. First, every worker is entitled to partici-
pate, directly or indirectly, in making decisions which affect him. The
union, recognized and protected by law, act3 as the worker's industrial
government in helping to determine the rules which govern his working life.
Its avowed purpose is to provide hia a voice in the decisions which so vitally
affect him. He is a citizen within the union and should be allowed to partici-
pate freely in the processes of self-government. Second, he is entitled to
equal treatment with all others governed by the union. The majority must not
be allowed to use its power to discriminate against him or arbitrarily deprive
him of his livelihood simply because he is a member of a racial or other
minority group which is too weak to protect itself. Third, he is entitled to
a fair trial on all charges brought against him. He shotild not be subject to
penalties or deprived of any of his rights of membership without full and open
hearing before an unbiased tribunal (A. C. L. U., 2).
UNIONS SHOULD IE DEMOCRATIC
The widespread demand that unions should be more democratic has not
always been accompanied by a statement of why unions should bear any heavier
obligation in this regard than other of our institutions. There seem to be
at least three compelling reasons why unions should have a special obligation
to maintain democratic standards. First, a union in collective bargaining
acts as the representative of every worker within the bargaining unit. The
union, in bargaining, helps to make laws; in processing grievances, acts to
enforce those laws; and in settling grievances, helpt to interpret and apply
those laws. The union is the worker's economic legislature; it is the worker's
industrial government. The union's power is the power to govern the working
lives of those for whom it bargains, and all governing should be exercised
democratically. Second, unions should be democratic because the power which
they hold over the worker is largely derived from the federal government.
Labor relations acts such as the Wagner Act affirmatively protect the right to
organise and place the government's seal of approval on unionization. In the
The Globe Ifechine and Stamping Co., 3 N.L.R.B., 294., 1937; the Allis-
Chalmers Mfg. Co.,I N.L.R.B. ,159, 1937; the Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co. ,10 NL.R.B.
14-70, 1939; and the Shipowners' Assoc, of the Pacific Coast, 7 N.L.R.B. 1002,1938.
%ational Labor Relations Act, Public Law Ho. 198, 74th Congress, Senate
1958, Section 1.
exercise of these power3 derived from government, unions should maintain
the sane democratic standards required of government itself. Tnird,
unions 3hould be democratic because the principal moral justification for
their existence is that they introduce an element of democracy into the
government of industry. They permit workers to have a voice in determining
the conditions under which they will work. This high objective of industrial
democracy can he fulfilled only if unions which sit at the bargaining table
are themselves democratic (A. C. L. U., 2).
ARE UlliaiS DEMOCRATIC?
The Right To Participate
The right of an individual to full and free participation in determining
the policies of the union is considered by many students in the field as
being the most important of all rights (A. C. L. U., 2). If this right is
protected, corrupt leaders can be overthrown, oppressive policies reversed,
and the government of the union reformed. The union will be what the work-
ers want it to be.
The right to participate involves the whole process by which majority
decisions are made. Within this process at least four elementary rights
seem to be crucial: fcho right to vote; the right of political action; the
right of free election; and the right to demand an accounting of union
affairs.
The Rirbt to Vote . A union may bar individuals from participation at
the very threshold by denying them admission to the union. Although a great .
majority of u^.'ons freely admit any worker who desires to join, a substantial
minority have denied workers full membership rights because of race, or
political beliefs. Of the 185 unions" studied by Summers (9), with a combined
membership of a little over 13£ million, a majority freely admit all workers
within their jurisdiction without any substantial restrictions. It can be
fairly stated as the general rule that the right of the worlcers to join is
complete, and this right can be defined in terms of the exceptions to this
general rule. Exceptions occur in those cases in Which persons within their
jurisdiction because of race, political beliefs, creed, sex, or because the
union ha3 a closed membership. These are the substantial grounds for ex-
clusion around which most contention has centered. However, there are a few
unusual grounds mentioned in various constitutions. The Blacksmiths exclude
members of "the state militia, sheriff »s office, police force, secret service,
or miner's police force." The United Mine Workers exclude members of the
National Chamber of Commerce, and the Longshoremen exclude anyone "dealing
in spiritous liquors" (Summers, 9).
Exclusion Because of Race: From its very beginning the labor movement
in this country has wrestled with the problem of admitting Negroes, l&ny
of the early craft unions either excluded them or segregated them in separate
locals. Toe constitutions of nine international unions explicitly deny the
right to join on racial grounds. While 32 out of a total of 185 inter-
national unions, with a combined membership of 2^- million out of a total
13i million, expressly deny the right to join because of race by provisions
in their constitutions, by-laws, or by established practices, forty-seven
with a total membership of 6,24-0,000, expressly protect that right to join
by provisions which prevent exclusion because of race (Summers, 9).
Some unions, such as the Woodworkers, spscificly prohibit exclusion by
Airline Disachers, Railroad Telegraphers (30,000), Railway and Steam-
ship clerks (204,000) Railway Mail Association (21,800), Switchmen (9,300),
^ocomotive Engineers (76,000), Locomotive Firemen and Enginemon (119 686)Railroad Trainmen (210,570), and the Railway Conductors (36,000) *
providing in their constitution that "no worker otherwise elegible to member-
ship shall be discriminated against or denied membership because of race...,"
but others, such as the United Mine Workers, 3imply provide that all workers
within the union's .-jurisdiction "shall be eligible regardless of color."
The Bricklayers protect against exclusion by providing that no person shall
be blackballed except for incompetency, and that any discrimination because
of race will be punishable by a fine of $100.00. These provisions purport
to admit or exclude workers, but the local practice may divert from this
norm because the international i3 either unwilling or unable to compel
compliance. Thus the Machinists local at Lockheed-Vega has admitted Negroes
in spite of the express prohibition in the international^ by-laws, and the
Providence local of the Boilermakers International has admitted Negroes on
a basis of equality, even though the international constitution provides for
exclusion by admitting only auxilaries (16). The boilermakers voted to give
auxilaries more automony and representation in the Metal Trades Council, and
the National Convention. Likewise, the Atlanta local of the United Mine
Workers refused to admit Negro janitors who were otherwise eligible, in spite
of the international constitutional provision against exclusion and strong
policy against discrimination (Northrup, 5). Although a significant minority
of railroad unions exclude from membership on racial grounds, a substantial
majority of unions do not exclude because of race.
Exclusion Because of Political Beliefs. To those who have been saturated
with the polemics against labor unions because of their alleged communistic
attitudes, it may come as a surprise to find at least thirty international
unions, with a total of nearly A, 000,000 members, having constitutional provisions
denying the right to join because of political affiliations or beliefs (Summers,
9). All of these provisions, except ti» Blacksmiths who exclude only members
of the I. W. W., contain clauses which either expressly or impliedly exclude
Comrnunists. Most of these provisions made membership in a forbidden organi-
zation the test. Thus the Woodworkers exclude "members of the Communist,
Nazi, and Fascist parties." The United Mine Workers add to this list members
of the I. W. W. and the Ku KLux Klan, and the Painters add members of the
German-American Bund. A few of these provisions made personal political be-
liefs the test. The Bill Posters excluded "anyone advocating the overthrow
of the government by force"; and the Teamsters barred any member of the
Communist Party or anyone who subscribes to its doctrines (Summers, 9).
In contrast to unions which exclude from membership because of particu-
lar political affiliations, twenty-nine unions protect the right to Join by
constitutional provisions which prohibit local unions from discriminating
on political grounds (Summers, 9). However, a substantial majority of unions
have constitutional provisions denying membership because of certain political
beliefs. For the most part these exclusions apnly to dissident fringe groups
whose interests are often inimical to labor, and whose admission might jeopard-
ize the life of the union. Communists are excluded not only from unions, but
from other private business organizations and government as well. This is,
of course, no justification for such discrimination.
Exclusion Because of Creed. Only two international unions have been
found which have any constitutional restrictions on admission because of
creed. The Master, Mate, and Pilots union requires a worker to be "a firm
believer in God, the Creator of the Universe," and the Railway Carmen Exclude
a worker unless "he believes in the Existence of a Supreme Being." Until
recently the Wire Weavers admitted only "White Christians" (Northrup, 5).
This provision no longer appears in the constitution. There is scant evidence
that unions attempt to enforce these provisions, and an overwhelming majority
of unions have no restrictions on admission because of creed.
9Exclusion Because of Sex. Labor unions in their early days ware looked
upon, in part, as social clubs for the working ran, and in such an organi-
zation women had no place. As unions became increasingly interested in the
economic -welfare of their members, the desire to exclude women continued
because of fear of competition for jobs. Only gradually have the inter-
nationals removed their constitutional bars against women, the last two being
the United Mine Workers in 1942 (2), and the Boilermakers in 1944- (A. C. L. U.,
2). Eight unions have constitutional provisions excluding women, and all but
three of these are railroad unions. The customary provision simply requires
a worker to be "mala" to be eligible for membership. Here again, many unions
take a contrasting position by giving constitutional protection to women in
their right to join. The constitutions of nineteen unions provided that no
trorker shall be excluded because of sex, and nineteen others provided that
"male and female" workers shall be eligible 5 these unions had a combined
membership of four and one-half million (Summers, 9). It is significant to
note that the unions which excluded women from membership through consti-
tutional provisions were in occupations where they were seldom employed. Most
unions in occupations employing women had no provisions excluding them from
membership.
Closed Unions. Only six international unions have provisions in their
constitutions relating to the practice of denying the right to join because
the union has closed its membership books or accepts only a few favored workers,
such as relatives of members. Both the Hosiery Workers and the Horseshoers
provide that no new members shall be accepted by a local when any of the locals
•'"Airline Dismtchers, Operating Engineers (100,000). Railway Mail As-
sociation (21,800), Switchmen (9,3^0), Wire Weavers (400), Railv/ay Trainway
(210,570), Railroad Yard Masters (3,500), and Railway Conductors (36,000),
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members are unemployed, and the Breuery Workers provide that no new workers
shall he admitted unless jobs are available (Summers, 9). On the other hand,
the Ratters and Wallpaper Craftsmen provide in their constitutions that the
rasmbership books shall not he closed without the consent of the Executive
Board of the International, and the Musicians provide that a local must accept
all competent musicians.
Refusal to adroit however, is not always open and direct. Initiation
fees and dues nay he set so high as to bar entryj apprenticeship training
may be required and then the number of apprentices limited; or competency
test may he required and then made impossible to pass. Generally, the older
unions of skilled workers have the highest dues and initiation fees. The
higher payments may be related to fraternal benefits, or may have arisen out
of other circv-mstances. 1'feny older unions of skilled workers, in addition
to protective functions collective bargaining have maintained systems
of benefits. Death benefits are the most common, but a number of unions
pay disability, old age, and limited sickness benefits (Taft, 12). Some
labor leaders have argued that with high dues and initiation fees a large
treasury, needed to support, the, union in difficult times, could be built,
while a low-dues union might not be able to sustain an attack from an employer.
Frequently, but not always, high dues accompany high initiation fees. The
latter has a dual objective. Older members are likely to contend that the
new recruit the "Johnny come lately" should pay a high initiation fee,
and thus bear some of the costs of raising the wage and working standards in
the industry. A high initiation fee also has the effect of excluding many
prospective applicants for membership and thereby allows the union members to
share a greater part of the available work.
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Of the 354- African Federation of labor local constitutions examined,
before the A. P. L.-C. I. 0. merger, 73 failed to specify the dues charged,
and dues in 31 others were in whole or in part a percentage of weekly earn-
ings, which make3 the precise amount paid indeterminate (Taft, 12). In
considering dres per month, the total contribution made by the union member
should be counted. Some unions specify a given amount as dues, and also
require additional contributions by the membership, for some particular
parpose. Data on the level of dues are available for 250 locals. All ex-
cept nine brewery workers* locals were affiliated xd.th the American Federa-
tion of Labor. Dues in the 250 locals ranged from 50 cents per month,
charged by a local of brewery workers, to v7.O0 per month, charged by a local
of electricians. The mode was $2.00 per month, charged by Si local unions;
33.00 per month, charged by 54- locals, was the next in importance. The
distribution is shown in Table 1. The median falls between '.?2.35 and $2.50
per month (Taft, 12).
Dues charged by union affiliated with the Congress of Industrial Organi-
zations were lower than those charged by unions affiliated with the A. F. of
L. In some instances the international union sets the dues for the entire
organization, and divergence from the amount set is allowed only by special
permission of the General Executive Board. The international union which
specify the dues to be charged in their constitutions are shown in Table 2.
Initiation fees are a charge imposed upon newly admitted members into
a union. Some unions specified that in addition to an initiation fee the
"Four are Federal locals. The others belong to the following unions:
bakery, bookbinders, bricklayers, building service, carpenters, electricians,
engravers, lathers, machinists, painters, plasterers, plumbers, printing
pressmen, roofers, sterotypers, 3treetcarmen, teamsters, and printers.
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Table I. Due3 in 250 local unions."
Amount of dues per month Number of local -unions charging
S .50
1.00
1.50
2.00
2.50
3.00
3.50
4-. 00
4.50
5.00
5.50
6.00
6.50
7.00
1
6
24
SI
27
54
17
a
5
10
1
1
1
1
Table 2. Dues specified by internationals 1 constitutions.'
Unions
Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural
Implement Workers of Arnsrica, United
Marine Cooks and Ste-ward3 Association of the
Pacific Coast
Maritime Union of America, national.
Office and Professional Workers of America, United.
Rubber Workers of Africa, United
Shoe Workers of America. •
Steel Workers of Africa, United
Stone and Allied Products Workers of America
Transport Workers of America.
Transport Service Enployeea of Arerica, United
*Taft (12).
Monthly dues
§1.00
1.50
2.50
2.00
1.00
2.18|-
1.00
1.25
1.75
1.50
applicant must pay a registration fee, or that in addition to a local fee one
must be paid to the International. From the point of view of the individual,
the total amount constituted the admittance or initiation fee; and in this
study all charges, except regular due3 assessments imposed upon the applicant
iThe local constitutions examined were varying dates. It was assumed that
no important changes had been made in the data since they were deposited in
several libraries in the years between 194-0 and 194-5 (Taft, 12).
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as a condition of admittance to the union, were regarded as the initiation
fee. Of the 354- local constitutions e;:amined by Taft (12), 54- failed to
specify their initiation fees. Initiation fees in the remaining 300 locals
ranged from $2.00 charged by five locals, to $350.00 required by one union;
see Table 3. The most cordon charge was §50.00, charged by 76 locals.
Table 3. Initiation fees in 300 locals.*
Control value of class intervals j Number of locals
$ 5.00 24-
10.00 24-
15.00 10
20.00 3
25,00 56
35.00 12
50.00 76
75.00 30
100.00 33
125.00 3
150.00 11
200.00 9
300.00 4-
_____
As with dues, so with initiation fees, the highest ones vere charged by
the skilled building trades unions. In contrast, the initiation foes in the
Federal labor unions, the building service trade, baker workers, bookbinders,
brewery workers, machinists, and streetcarmen were comparatively low. Four
unions, the typographers, steriotypers, printing pressmen, and teamsters,
fell in between the high and lew groups. There was a slight tendency for
locals in smaller communities to charge lower dues and initiation fees than
locals established in the larger cities. It would be difficult, however, to
work out a correlation between size of the community and the amount of dues
and initiation fees. Length of time in the industry would influence the level
of initiation fees (Taft, 12).
uWhile due3 and Initiation fees are the main charges borne by union
members, assessments are by no means unimportant. Since they are not
regular levies, it is difficult to determine how frequently they are imposed.
In general, unions seek to avoid levying assessments because such irregular
and uncertain imposts are likely to create dissatisfaction. In 1939, several
anthracite miners struck against an international assessment, in more recent
times, the membership of the International Typographical Union overwhelmingly
rejected a proposal for increasing assessments (Taft, 12).
Assessments can be levied by either the International, the District,
if one exists, or by the local union. As a rule the conditions under which
assessments can be imposed were outlined in the union constitutions. An
international assessment in the International Association of Kachinists must
be approved by two-thirds of the vote of all members attending a summoned
meeting. The International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers specify that
if the defense fund falls below $20, 000. CO an assessment of 50 cents on each
male and 25 cents on each female can be levied. In addition, if the pension
fund falls below $250,000.00, an assessment of Si.00 can be levied on all
except pensioners. The constitution of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers
authorized the International ^resident and the Secretary-Treasurer "to levy
one or more additional assessments" until there are enough funds to meet the
losses arising from accidents to members. The General Executive Board of the
International Association of Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers
is allowed "to levy an assessment sufficient to replenish the treasury and
meet all demands created by...an emergency." Locals of the same union can
levy a local assessment provided the proposal has been presented to the local
union in writing, read at three consecutive meetings, and been approved by a
majority vote of all members present at the third meeting. If the income of
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the Journeymen Berbers* Union is insufficient to meet the expenses of the
union., a referendum on levying an assesar-ont can be taken* In contrast, the
General Executive Board of the Boot and Show Workers* Union "can levy such
assessments as they deam necessary." Local unions of the same international
can levy assess-ents -with the approval of the General Executive Eoard, (Taft,
12).
Locals of the International Typographical Union can levy special assess-
ments, if such levies are approved by the members on a referendum vote. The
requisite majority is determined by the local constitution. In addition,
"must plainly explain the necessity for the proposed charge." The painter's
union requires that a proposal for levying a lecal assessment must be "laid
over at least one \*-eek for consideration" and be approved by a majority of
those present at a meeting. The Granite Cutter's International Association
allows its locals to Impose an assessment upon their members "not to exceed
one dollar." The procedure for levying is not specified (Taft, 12).
In sumarizing, contributions for dues and initiation fees in labor
unions are not uniform. Skilled trades xMch pay a vide variety of benefits
and which have been organised for the longest periods require the highest
contributions. Originally built en the theory that a large treasury provided
a margin of safety, they have continued to charge high dues and initiation
fees because of the benefits they furnish. For example, members of the
electricians 1 union 65 ^ars of age and in continuous good standing for
twenty years can draw pensions of &0 per month. A death benefit is also
paid. In addition, many locals operate independent sick and death benefit
systems. These activities nust be financed out of dues. Whenever these
unions take in non-beneficial members, the latter are charged lower dues. The
more recently organized unions pay no benefits, and consequently do not require
16
so high a level of due 3 to maintain themselves. On the whole, there is no
evidence that dues are generally exorbitant, and many "low dues" unions have
found that too low contributions hamper the proper functioning of the organi-
zation. High initiation fee3 were devised at a tine when craft unions were
exclusive and tried to Halt their membership to what they believed was the
available employment in the trade. They are found mainly in the skilled
crafts. Unions that seek mass membership among semi-skilled and unsldlled
labor find high initiation fee 3 impractical. The evidence seems to indicate
that relatively few unions charge exorbitant initiation fees, and not many
workers are affected by them (Taft, 12).
By way of summary, llegroes were barred from about one-sixth of organ-
ized labor, including most railroad unions and most of the building and
printing trades. One-fourth of the international unions barred members of
undesired political groups such as Cormunists, Fascists, or Klansnen. Ex-
clusions because of citizenship, sex, or creed were relatively infrequent.
Although the post-war years have shown marked decreases in exclusion because
of race, creed, or sex, there has been a marked increase in exclusion be-
cause of political beliefs. The practice of closing the union membership
to all but a chosen few is also relatively infrequent. The right to vote
seem protected in a substantial majority of cases.
The Right to Free Political Action. The right to vote may be hallow
unless the cembers of the union are free to debate the policies of the
union, criticize the conduct of the office- a, form an organized opposition,
and campaign during union elections. The process of free criticism, election-
eering, and debate is the very heart of the democratic determination of
majority will. However, full protection of this freedom is not without
sericu3 dangers. Vigorous action may degenerate into factional strife of
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such bitterness that the energy of the union is dissipated and it becomes
too divided to bargain effectively with the employer. The union needs out-
ward strength to deal with the employer, but it needs internal freedom for
political activity of its members.
Nearly every constitution contains provisions which may be used to
curb freedom of political action within the union. Half of the international
unions have provisions which limit the criticism of officers and fellow
members (A. C. L. U. , 2). In 194-4- the opposition candidate in one of the
large industrial unions was expelled on charges of circulating derogatory
statements concerning officers in their official capacity (A. C. L. B., 2),
Opposition to officers in union elections frequently reveals the degree of
control the officers exercise. In a study itfiich examined seven unions, 764
offices had been filled in the period between 1910 and 1941? the results are
summarised in Table 4- (Taft, 13).
Of the total 764- officers chosen, 634- ran for office unopposed and 130,
or 17 per cent, of the officers were uncontested. The percentages of offices
contested in the seven unions in this period varied from 5 per cent in the
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffers, Helpers and Warehousemen,
to 52 per cent in the Journeymen Barbers International Union. Out of a total
of S3 officers elected by the Brotherhood of Bail\jay Carmen since 1910,
twenty-one were challenged. Six presidential offices were filled and one
contest took place. In the seven conventions of the International Brotherhood
of Teamsters, Chauffers, Helpers and Warehousemen, a total of 65 officers
had been elected. The International president in 1944- was first elected in
1907 by defeating the incumbent, and had not been challenged since 1910
(Taft, 2).
IS
Table 4. Humber of offices filled and number of other offices contested in
seven international unions.*
-
'
'
Union organization
i—
i
: Total offices : Uncontested : Contested
:AH: Pros. :0ther:All:Pre3. : Other :A11: %z Pres. : *: Dther
121
:%
Total 764- 63 701 634 54 5S5 130 17 9 14 17
Brotherhood of Rail-
S3 6 77 62 5 57 21 25 1 17 20 26
Analganated Assoc, of
Street, Electrical
Railway, & Motor
222 15 207 205 15 190 17 S 17 S
International Brother
hood of Teamsters,
Chauffers, Helpers
65 7 5S 62 7 55 3 5 3 5
United Brotherhood
of Carponters and
96 S SS 64 5 59 32 33 3 3S 29 33
Bricklayers, Masons,
& Plasterers Inter-
S3 7 76 79 7 72 4 5 4 5
Journeyren Barbers
International Union, 67 6 61 32 3 29 35 52 3 50 32 53
Hotel & Restaurant
Employees Inter-
national Alliance
& Bartenders Inter-
us 14 134 130 12 118 IS 12 2 14 16 19
^Elections ware held at different intervals by different unions, and the
nunber of officers chosen changed with tire. Soretires one or more offices
were not filled at conventions. In this table the election of an officer for
one term \m.3 counted a3 one. Consequently, each office was counted separately
for each term (Taft, 13).
The opposition to the re-election of officers ray have no relation to
the rethod of election. While six of the unions selected their officers at
conventions, the United Carpenters and Joiners of Africa chose their officials
by referendum ballot. Of course, it might be argued that the lack of opposi-
tion showed satisfaction with the performance of those in office. However,
there cay be additional reasons. In sore organizations it ray be both diffi-
cult and dangerous to challenge the heads of the union in an election duel,
even i/hen the oprxinent may have sore chance of success. In 1936, J.W. Williams
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allowed his nane to go before the convention of the Carpenters Union as a
candidate for president to oppose the incuribent, W. D v Eutchison. Williams
was not an unknown and be wa3 an established trade union official of soiaa
inportance, yet the situation appeared so hopeless that he withdrew his ran©.
Soon thereafter Williams was forced out as president of the Building Trades
Department of the American Federation of Labor which was dominated by the
Carpenters Union.
Between 1899 and 1903 John Mitchell served as president of the United
Mine Workers of America. His prestige because of his successful leadership
in the anthracite strikes of 1900 and 1902 however, was such that no one
would challenge him for office. A3 soon a3 he retired, the office was con-
tested. John L. Lewis took office in 1920, and he was opposed for election
in 1920, 1924., and 1926. Those were the last tines that attempts were made
to beat Lewis, as of 1944. Both John Brophy and Alexander Howard, who ran
against Lewis in 1926, were eliminated from the union because of their
opposition (Taft, 13).
A later study by Philip Taft included thirty-four union elections be-
tween 1900 and I94.S, with the election of 2307 general officers being re-
corded (Taft, 14-). With the election of 2307 officers, there were 1770 who
were uncontested; the remaining 537, which was 23.2 per cent of the total,
were contested. Taft (U), concluded that "... the absence of formal op-
position, since differences may bo settled or compronises evolved at confer-
ences held by the significant leaders behind the scenes..."
Divisions within a union are not always desirable, but \/hen they do
not impede the efficiency of the union or complicate the problems involved
in collective bargaining, the factions may act as a check upon the official
exeessess and promote honest and effective administration (Taft, 13).
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Tho ideal in union political democracy i3 exemplified by the Interna-
tional Typographical Union, characterized by two well marched political
parties, it conducts regular and orderly "campaigns*, where the issues are
fully discussed and positions taken and defended by proponents of both sides.
In contrast to many labor unions, the International Typographical Union has
never experienced an influx of thousands of new members. Ifertbership in-
creases have been slow and steady. As a result, new members are assimilated
by the organization; they become aware of the unions practices and learn its
ideals. Bargaining is conducted primarily on a local basis, and the oppor-
tunities for intervention in the local union »s affairs by the international
officers are reduced. Although international representatives frequently
participate in negotiations with the employer, they are there to assist tho
local bargaining committee, rather than to bargain on a regional or national
basis. The total membership voting in elections has ranged from 54#3 per
cent in 1904 to SL.4. per cent in 1924. Moreover, the margin that divides
the victorious and the defeated candidates has usually been narrow, so that
officers must be on their mettle. The existence of political parties auto-
matically creates a board of critics for the administration in power; the
administration in 'turn naturally seeks to avoid giving the opposing faction
ammunition for the next campaign. "The age and traditions of the I. T. U,,
the slow and steady growth, have all made the printers' union a microocosnt
of democracy and a model for all labor organisation" (Taft, 13).
Unions may curtail freedom of tho press by prohibiting the issuing of
any circular without the consent of the international officers. In ore in-
stance members were expelled because they had circulated, without approval,
a pamphlet objecting to the pay of the international officers. A few unions
prohibited the organising of any groups within the union whose purpose was to
21
shape the policies of the
-union or to determine the choice of officers. One
large union flatly prohibited any political campaigning within the union.
In addition to these provisions \ihi.ch placed 3poclflc limitations on politi-
co!, action, mo3t anion constitutions had more vague clauses which night bo
used to curtail criticism or debate. Union members may bo expelled for
"causing dissention," "creating disharmony," or for "conduct unbecoming a
union lumber." In a number of cases these provisions had been used to silence
those who questioned union policies or challenged the officers in power
(Freidan, 3).
By way of summary, nearly every constitution contained provisions which
might be used to curb the right to free political action. Half of the inter-
national unions had constitutional provisions which limited union members'
right to criticise the union officers and fellow members. In the study of
seven unions cited above, from the total 764. officers chosen in ejections,
634 ran for office unopposed. While one need not necessarily imply from
thi.3 the absence of effective political opposition, this conclusion certainly
is invitedj the right to free political action is seriously limited, at
least potentially, either by constitutional provisions or by coercive actions
of individual union officers
»
22. Ri"ht of Free Elections . The right to belong to a union and to
engage in political action is enhanced when adequate protection is given
to the voting process through which the individual member rakes his wishes
known. Many union political matters were typically decided by direct vote
and debate in the local meeting, others were made through referenda of all
union members, and still ethers were determined by officers or delegates
who were elected by the members to represent them (A. C. L. U., 2). Although
some of those methods of making decisions may enable the members to speak
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with a clearer and more effective voice than tlie others, all seen to be
democratic methods. But regardless of the other methods used, the voting
process nust be protected.
There seen to be three essential requirements for meeting the right of
free elections. The first essential is that each nenber be free to vote as
he chooses. This essential is fully recognised in the secret ballot, but
it is endangered vfcen votes are taken by a show of hands in open meetings.
If the issue i3 hotly contested, and particularly if the officers have taken
a strong hand, the ordinary member nay not vote his true convictions for
fear of possible reprisals. Although he is too timid to speak his mind, he
is still entitled to hi3 vote. The right to a free choice nay be denied in
nore subtle ways.. Opposition candidates nay be prevented fron obtaining
nominations, or be forced to withdraw under threats. Issues submitted for
referenda nay be misrepresented or presented without suitable alternatives,
or the members may merely be asked to ratify action already taken by the
officers. These devices maintain only the empty form of democracy while
denying the basic right to choose freely between genuine alternatives
(A. C. L. TJ.,2).
A second essential for the election process seen3 to be that the votes
be honestly counted. If the election tellers represent conflicting points
of view there is little danger, but if they are appointed by the officers
in power, they nay falsify the returns and thereby frustrate the majority
will* Thi3 danger can be easily avoided, as it has been done by some unions,
by having the whole election supervised by an independent agency such as
the Honest Ballot Association (A. C. L. U., 2),
The third essential ia that qualified persons elected to positions by
the membership be allowed to serve. If a local union officer i3 arbitrarily
T~
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removed by the international officers, or if a delegate to the convention
is denied admittance because he advocates certain union policies, it i3
not merely the officer or the delegate who is injured. The whole local
membership has been deprived of its ballot.
No systematic effort to assess the degree to which unions generally
adhere to these minimum requirements seems to have been undertaken, hence
no judgement can be made in this respect.
The Ripht to Derand an Accounting of Union Affairs . The right to
participate doe 3 not end in the voting booth, for participation in policy-
making is bb» formality if the policies decided by the majority are not
carried out} if issues have been decided by direct vote, the members have
a right to know what steps are being taken to enforce those decisions
(A. C. L. U., 2). If officers have been elected the members are entitled
to know hoi/ they are conducting the union's business and whether they are
fulfilling their pledges. The members 1 right to an accounting of union
affairs helps insure that decisions made through the democratic process are
not frustrated, and it also greatly aids the members in making future choices
of policies and leadership.
An essential part of this right is the right to an accounting for union
funds, for the use of the union treasury is one of the critical policies to
be governed by the members. There, the right is mora than the right that
money not be stolen, it i3 the right of nembers that union funds be used
for the purpose determined by their vote. Illustrative of thi3 is the issue
which Local 47 of the African Federation of Musicians, which is the second
largest local in the A. F. M., i3 having
-jith the international. At issue
is whether the funds of the recording musicians of the local are being used
by James C. Petrillo, the international president, to build up union trust
1
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fun&3 at the expanse of their individual rights as performing artists. The
quarrel is actually xdth what the members see as Petrillo's arbitrary and
undemocratic handling of A. F. M.*S Music Performance Trust Fund, to which
Local 47' s members are the major contributors but from which they receive
little returns. Mr. Bead, the local 's president, told the executive board
of the A. F. M. that the local had lost $3,000,000 during the past two years
because money they felt they had earned was being diverted into the contro-
versial fund (Ilendrick, 4-)»
There are also certain dangers involved in the union *s giving full ac-
counting of all union affairs. If the employer knows all the details of the
union's objectives and strategy, and knows the limits of it3 resources, the
union may be seriously handicapped in its bargaining with him. If the union
makes full disclosure to its members, then the employers are almost certain
to know. This again is one of the dilemmas of a democracy. However essential
the right to demand an accounting of union affairs may seem to be, there is
not enough evidence available to determine the facts regarding the extent to
which unions were or were not meeting this right.
By way of summarizing, at least four elementary rights seem to be crucial
in protecting the right to participate in union affairs: (l) the right to
votej (2) the right of political action? (3) the right of free ejections j and
U) the right to demand an accounting of union affairs. The right to vote seems
protected in a substantial majority of cases. The evidence would seem to indl-
'
cate that the right of free political action i3 seriously limited, at least
potentially, either by constitutional provisions or by coer3ive action of
individual union officers. No systematic effort to assess the degree to which
'•The Taft-Hartley Act now requires unions to account for many of their
internal affairs.
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union3 generally adhere to the requirement of free election seems to have
been undertaken, hence, no judgment can be made in thi3 respect. The right
to demand and accounting of union affair3 is now protected by the Taft-Hartley
Act. However, there is insufficient evidence to determine the extent to \;hich
unions \teve meeting this essential requirement prior to 1947.
The conclusion is that there is a substantial lack of evidence to support
any definitive judgment on the extent to which a majority of U. S. unions
protected the right to participate in union affairs.
The Right to Fair and Equal Treatment
Participation provides self-government through the free operation of
majority will, but democracy also demands that the power of the majority be
limited for the protection of the minority. Even though a worker* 3 right to
participate in union affairs is recognised, the full measure of democracy
may not be met. Runaway majorities must not be allowed to discriminate
arbitrarily against minority groups and obtain benefits for themselves at
the' expense of those vjho lack the political strength to resist. Workers,
lite citizens, are entitled to fair and equal treatment by their government
(Summers, 11 ).
The danger of discrimination is most acute, it seems, when the union
in bargaining helps determine who shall be entitled to the jobs available.
Seniority clauses govern the individuals' right to work. They are an accepted
and valuable part of our industrial pattern, but they can be manipulated by
the majority to obtain job preference at the expense of the minority. Thu3,
a railroad brotherhood negotiated a contract which virtually destroyed the
seniority rights of llegro firemen and insured their ultimate elimination
from the work (florthrup, 5).
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A cruder device of job allocation is combining the closed shop with a
restriction concerning admission to the union. When a union excludes Negroes,
5.t enforces a job preference based on race. When it admits only sons of
members, then job rights are based on ancestry. And when the union excludes
women it is discriminating in job lights on the basis of sex,. These standards
of preference are a direct denial of the right to fair and equal treatment.
Since the evil is not that unions determine who shall work, but that
their determination is arbitrary, the test i3 not necessarily whether union
membership i3 closed, but why it is closed. In the building trades \jorkers
shift frequently from job to job, so customary seniority clauses are meaning-
less. A closed shop with a closed union may at times mean 3imply that new-
comers are- exluded until older workers are employed. If more men are needed
temporarily, new workers are granted work permits, but when jobs becoiae
scarce they are bumped by union members (A. C. L. U., 2). The closed union
may thus provide in seme situations a rough form of industrial seniority.
Curing the depression a number of unions informally closed their membership
because large numbers of their members were out of work, and at least two
unions provided in their constitutions that no new member could be admitted
by a local when any of its members were unemployed (A. C. L. U., 2).
The right to equal treatment cannot mean that a member is entitled to
perfect equality, for complete equality is impossible of cither definition
or achievement. The union must retain enough freedom to surrender seme de-
mands to achieve power, even though the final bargain benefits some workers
more than others » But the majority ought not compromise the claims of the
minority only to achieve benefits for themselves.
Discrimination may take many forms, and it may be extremely subtle. In
one Instance, when two companies consolidated, the employees of the large
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company used their majority control to place the employees of the smaller
company at the bottom of the seniority list (A. C. L. U., 2). In another
case, a union obtained a retroactive wage increase based on inequities in
job classification. When it was discovered that the bull: of the back pay
would go to a relatively small group of employees, the majority voted that
the total amount should be divided equally among all employees (A. C, L. U.,
2). The railroad brotherhoods frequently refused to process grievances of
llegroes, or have withdrawn grievances in return for favorable settlement on
grievances of white members (Northrup, 5). In many situations it is impossible
to determine whether the union has acted in good faith or whether it has
deliberately bartered away the rights of the minorities for majority gains.
The danger of discrimination is obviously greater whore individuals are
excluded from the union, and are therefore unable to exercise influence
through the political process within the union. Hcwrer, the right to
participate in union affairs doe3 not guarantee equal treatment, for the
majority may ride roughshod over the minority. Union democracy requires that
the union's power over the worker must not be used arbitrarily, and that each
worker must be given fair and equal treatment.
Concern has been mostly with why the right to fair and equal treatment
should be met, and very little with whether or not it has been. There is no
evidence available to reach a definite conclusion on the extent to which a
majority of unions have met this requirement.
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Tho Right to a Fair Trial
Trials and appoals have been established by anions to compel obedience
or to impose punishment if members are found guilty of violating their
obligations. The trial hearing i3 seldom held by the union a3 a whole, but
by a trial committee vhich reports its findings and recommendations to the
local for it3 approval; 106 unions have provisions for such a trial committee.
In 46 unions, the elected officers act as the hearing board j five unions
provide for a permanent committee vhich shall hear all discipline case3 duriig
it3 term of office; and 55 unions provide for the naming of a temporary
committee to hear each case as it arises (Summers, 10).
The hearing board usually consists of from five to seven members, al-
though the Boilermakers has only three members, and the Stone Workers has
fifteen. Where the hearing board consists of a special committee, various
methods are provided for choosing that committee. In 23 unions it is ap-
pointed by the President or the executive committee; in 19 unions it i3
elected by the membership; while in six it i3 chosen from the membership by
lot (Summers, 10), The Granite Cutters allow the defendent to choose three
members of the trial committee, the local elects throe, and these agree on
a seventh, A relatively small number of unions attempt to protect against
biased members sitting on the trial committee; 21 unions exclude the ones
filing the charges or anyone directly or indirectly interested in the case.
In addition, 10 unions permit the accused to challenge the board members,
but in 3ome„ Ill's the Packinghouse Workers, the number of challenges is
limited to three, while in others, like the Stagehands, the challenges may
be denied by the executive committee which acts as the trial board (Summers,
10).
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Constitutional provisions regulating the conduct of the hearings are
scarce and incomplete. Many have no provisions whatever, or merely require
a fair and impartial hearing. The right of counsel is guaranteed b-7 about
half of the unions. Distrust of outsiders in general, and lawyers in particu-
lar, is reflected in the almost uniform requirement that counsel must be
chosen from the membership, and the Painters provide specifically that "the
member selected shall not bo a lawyer. w Only the Inland Boatmen and- the Auto
Workers allow legal counsel, and 79 unions provided that the defendant shall
have counsel; 74 of these specifically provide that he shall be a member in
good standing, th-ee do not state who he shall be, and two expressly permit
lawyers (Summers, 10).
Although the right of the defendant to hear the evidence against him-
self and to cross-examine witnesses is Implicit In the mors general provi-
sions, only 22 unions explicitly give this right. Uino unions require that
the trial shall be a closed hearing, but the Locomotive Engineers provide
that it shall be held at the union meeting, with the trial committee sitting
as jury. Ten unions require that a complete record must be made of all the
evidence in the case, but 15 require that only a summary of the evidence
must be made. Uniform!;*-, the constitutions provide that if the aecused fails
to appear for the hearing, without a reasonable excuse, the trial may proceed
in his absence (Summers, 10).
The function of a trial committee is to hold a hearing, collect the
evidence, a;id report its findings to the local for action. The findings
almost always include recommendations as to guilt or innocence and as to the
penalty to be inflicted. Although this is "toe most common procedure, thew>
are two substantial variations. In 30 unions, such as the Building Service
Employees, the findings of the trial committee are final and no ratification
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by the local is required. la 15 unions the trial committee is eliminated
and the trial is held before the local itself, which hears the evidence first
hand then votes the vordict.
The procedure at the ratification stage usually consists of a presenta-
tion of the findings of the committee, vdth a summary of the evidence on
which it is ba3edj 15 unions provide that the accused shall have an oppor-
tunity at this stage to present arguments in his behalf denying hi3 guilt
or justifying hi3 conduct, but three, such as the I5achinists, expressly
prohibit any argument or debate on the trial committees recomi;Bndation3,
and require that the local 3hall immediately vote. The vote on guilt or
innocence is frequently separated froo the vote on the penalty to be in-
flicted. In the great majority of unions, guilt is determined by a simple
majority vote. Only 17 unions require as much as a two-thirds vote on the
question of guilt, but 16 others require at least a two-third3 vote before
a member can be expelled. The Eodcarriers provide that the reconmendations
of the trial committee shall be upheld unless rejected by a two-third3 vote
(Summers, 10) t
The usual appeals available are, in succession, to the international
president, to the international executive board, and to the international
convention. A few unions, such as the Electrical Workers and the United
Mine Workers, provide that the first appeal shall be to the District Council,
and the Amalgamated Clothing Workers similarly provide for an appeal to the
Joint Board (Summers, 10).
The procedure used by a local in a discipline case may occasionally
ignore that prescribed by the international constitution, and fail to give
the accused member a fair trial. However, the great importance which union
officials normally place on the constitution a3 a guide in difficult situations,
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and the danger of being rebuked on appeal, tend to beep abuse3 of discipline
procedure at a minimum. A study of 218 reported cases tended to confirm this
conclusion (Summers, 10 ). Although failure to use proper procedure seems to
be a veil-accepted basis for legal reliof, no procedural defect was claimed
in 42 of these cases. In 37 others, in which defects ware claimed, the
court explicity stated that the defect vas not substantial. In only 73
cases did the court indicate that there was sufficient defect to amount to
a denial of a fair trial. In the 66 remining cases the report did not
indicate vihether any defects were claimed or whether they found them to be
substantial (Summers, 10 ). These cases included only those instances in
which union discipline was most subject to criticism, yet in le33 than half
of them did the court find any real violations of procedural fairness. This
relatively small proportion of miscarriage in the most questionable cases
seems to indicate that union practices were, on the whole, reasonably fair.
FEDERAL AMD STATE REGULATION OF IHTERHAL UHI01T AFFAIRS
Federal Regulation
The enactment of the Taft-Hartley amendments to the national Labor
Relations Act marked the first Congressional attempt to regulate the internal
affairs of Labor unions.1 It is the purpose of this chapter to note the most
important of these regulatory provisions and to attempt to assess their signi-
ficance.
The major interest of Congress in the area of union administration seemed
to be the preservation of the individual's right to work as a non-union man.
Aaron and Komaroff (l). As amended, Section 7 guarantees the right of
X6l Statute, H6, 194-7; 29 U.S.O..A., 141.
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employees to refrain from any or all union activities. This general guarantee
is qualified by Section 8 (a) (3), which permits the raking of union-shop or
maintenance-of-membership agreements in certain cases; 3uch an agreement is
legal if, (l) it is wade with an. undoninated, unassisted union which has been
certified as the bargaining representative of employees in the unit covered
by the agreement made; and (2) the majority of employees in the unit eligible
to vote have authorised the union to make such an agreement." But the follow-
ing proviso adds further qualifications:
Provided further, that no employer shall justify any discrimination
against an employee for non-memberslip in a labor organisation (A) if he
has reasonable grounds for believing that such membership wa3 not avail-
able to the employee en the same terms and conditions generally appli-
cable to other members, or (B) if he has reasonable grounds for believ-
ing that membership */as de.iied or terminated for reasons other than the
failure of the employee to tender the periodic dues and tho initiation
fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining member-
ship.2
The corresponding provision in the amendments applicable to unions is
Section 8 (b) (2), which makes it an unfair practice for a union:
to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against
an employee in violation of subsection (a) (3) or to discriminate a-
gainst an employee with respect to whom membership in such organisa-
tion has been denied or terminated on some ground other than failure
to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly required
as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership.3
With respect to initiation fees, the amendments provide further, in
Section 8 (b) (5), that it is an unfair practice for a union to require of
employees covered by a valid union-security agreement an initiation fee which
the National Labor Relations Beard finds "excessive or discriminatory under
all circumstances. "4
^This provision \jas deleted in 1951 j Public Law 189.
2Labor Management Relations Act, 194-7, Public Law 101, Section 8 (a) (3).
3Ibid, Section 8 (b) (2).
4-Ibid, Section 8 (b) (5).
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Section 8 (b) (l) of the Act makes it an unfair practice for a union
to "restrain or coerce employees in the e:torcise of the rights guaranteed
in Section 7;" but to this is added the following significant provisot
Provided, that this paragraph shall not impair the right of a
labor organisation to prescribe its own rules with respect to the ac-
quisition or retention of membership therein,1
This means, although employees are guaranteed the right to refrain from
any or all union activities, unions can prescribe any rules for admission
into the organisation, such as racial requirements, which it believes
necessary.
Two other indirect forms of control over internal union affairs were
initiated by the Taft-Hartley Act. Section 9 (f ) and 9 (g) provide that
no union may have access to the National Labor Relations Board unless it
files with the Secretary of Labor, a detailed and current statement con-
taining information regarding it3 officers, the procedures for their selection,
salaries, dues and initiation fees, qualifications for membership, and other
related data. 2 In addition, financial reports must be filed in the form
prescribed by the Secretary of Labor each year, and copies of such reports
must be furnished to the union membership. Section 9 (h) similarly denies
access to the Board to any union unless each of its officers ha3 executed
currently or within the preceding twelve-month period and filed with the
Board an affidavit concerning hi3 membership with the Communist Party.
It appears that the restrictions^ of Section 8 (b) (l) of the Taft-Hartley
Act have no effect upon the policies of unions which neither possess nor desire
union-security agreements* and even in case 3 in which such agreements exist,
the statute seem3 to protect employment rather than union membership. Congress
ibid., Section 8 (b) (5)J
TEbid., Sections 9 (f) and 9 (g)«.
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apparently felt that arbitrary restrictions upon admission to union nsriber-
shlp and undemocratic expulsions of union members are natters of public
concern only if the direct and immediate result of such practices is loss
of employment. It either overlooked or disregarded the fact that the arbi-
trary denial of admission to membership can •work to the serious detriment
of employees, \ri.thout actually costing then their jobs; and that arbitrary
expulsion from union membership, even if it does not occasion the discharge
of the expelled nember, can undermine the democratic structure of the union.
The filing requirements of Sections 9 (f), (g), and (h) of the Taft-
Hartley Act are not compulsory, but most unions comply with these require-
ments in order to file representation or complaint cases *;ith the Board.
Although it seems that fexjer workers than formerly are now being dis-
charged as a consequence of their expulsion from a union which has a union-
security agreement with the employer, there is no way of knowing how many
of the workers expelled for valid reasons still hold their jobs by virtue
of the restrictions in the Act dealing with unfair practices of both the
employer and the union.
And despite all the hue and cry over allegedly exorbitant initiation
fees, not a single case charging a union with violating the "excessive initi-
ation fees" section of the Act has been reported (Aaron and Komaroff, l).
There i3 no indication, moreover, that the few unions known to require ex-
cessive initiation fee3 have altered their policies since passage of the
Taft-Hartley Act (Aaron and Komaroff, l).
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State Regulation
Twenty-two states and the territory of Hawaii have adapted legislation
regulating, directly or indirectly, the internal affairs of labor unions.
The other twenty-six states and the territories of Alaska and Puerto Rico
have no statues of this type. Included in this list are three major industri-
al states, California, Illinois, and Ohio. Michigan nay be put in this
category because its only law purporting to regulate the internal affairs
of unions requires registration with the Attorney General of the state by
any labor union "controlled by agencies serving the objects and purposes of
a foreign power." (Aaron and Komaroff, l).
Sixteen states have statutes regulating, directly or indirectly, union
o
rule3 relating to the admission, discipline, or activities of union members.
The largest single group consists of the 12 states having so-called F. E. P. C.
statutes, which are applicable to employers and employment agencies, as -well
as to unions. These statutes are designed to prevent and eliminate discrimi-
nation in employment based on race, creed, color, or national origin. Four
of the 12 states, Indiana, Kansas Nebraska, and Wisconsin, have established
only a policy against such discrimination in employment, without providing
any means of enforcing it. The remaining eight states have provided a variety
of sanctions, ranging from cease and desist orders to fines and imprisonment.
The first of these statutes, the New York State Law Against Discrimination, was
enacted in March, 1945. This law provides, in part, that it shall be unlaxjful:
.
-'•Alabama, Colorado, Coimecticut, Florida, Idaho, Kansas, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Oregon,
Pennsvlvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington and Wisconsin.
^Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Indiana, Kan3a3, Massachusetts, Nebraska,
New Jersey, New Mexico, Now York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas,
Washington, and Wisconsin.
^Connecticut, Indiana, Kansas, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New Jersey, New
Mexico, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Washington, and Wisconsin,
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For a labor organisation, bocauso of race, creed, color, or
national origin of any individual, to exclude or to expel from its
membership such Individual or to discriminate in any way against any
of it3 BBabers or against any employer or any individual employed by
an employer.-'-
Eight states have enacted other laws either in place of, or in addition
to, the types already mentioned.2 The declaration of policy in the Colorado
Labor Peace Act states, in part, as follows:
All rights of parsons to Join labor organizations or unions and
their rights and privileges as members thereof, should be recognised,
safeguarded, and protected. So person shall be denied membership in a
labor organisation or union on account of race, color, religion, sex,
or by any unfair or unjust discrimination... (Aaron and Komaroff, l).
The Kansas and Nebraska laws are the same in all material respects, ex-
cept that the former specifically excluded employers and employees covered
by the Railway Labor Act. The Florida law cakes it unlawful for any
person:
To interfere with or prevent the right of franchise of any member
of a labor organization. The right of franchise shall include the
right of an employee to sake complaint, file charges, give information
or testimony concerning the violations of this chapter, or the peti-
tioning to his union regarding any grievance he may have concerning
his membership or employment, or the maiding known facts concern5jig
such grievances or violations of law to any public officials, and
Ms right of free speech (Aaron and Komaroff, l).
Violations of the above law are punishable by fine and imprisonment.
Massachusetts has directed particular attention to the rights of union
raambers employed under ^union-security agreements. Its State Labor Relations
Law provides that any employee who is required, as a condition of employment,
to become or remain a union member, may appeal to the Labor Relations
Commission for any alleged unfair denial of admission to, or suspension cxr
expulsion from, the union. A hearing before the Commission i3 provided for,
-'-Similar Laws may be found in the laws of Connecticut, Massachusetts, New
Jersey, Hew Ifexico, Oregon, Rhode Island, and Washington.
-Colorado, Florida, Kansas, Massachusetts, Nebraska, Pennsylvania, Texas,
and Wisconsin.
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and if the Commission finds that the employ was unfairly denied
admission
to membership la the union, or that the discipline
complained of:
(1) Was imposed by the labor organisation in violation
of its
conotitatloV and by-laws; or (2) lias teposed without a fair
trial,
including an adequate hearing and opportunity to defend; or (3)
»*
St warranted by the offense, if any committed by »*-***»*-
gainst the labor organisation; or (4) Is not eonsisoent f^^Q ,
established public policy of the commonwealth; (Aaron and
Komaroff, 1),
the, the Commission can order the labor union to admit
or restore the employee
to rBmbership, or to refrain from seeking to
proems his discharge.
The Colorado, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin statutes
approach this particu-
lar regulatory problem indirectly, by Baking it an
unfair labor practice for
an employer to enter into a union-security agreement
which does not meet
specified conditions, The Pennsylvania Labor Relations
Act, while permitting
union-security agreei*nts under conditions similar to
those prescribed in
Section a (3) of the Wagner Act, adds the following
proviso:
...if such labor organization does not deny membership
*»**•
organization to a person or persons who are employees of
the ^ployer
at the the o*» tho%aking of such agreement, provided, such
employee
was^ot employed 5n violation of any previously
existing agreement with
said labor organisation (Aaron and Komaroff, 1)
The Wisconsin Employment Peace Act permits all union
agreements under certain
circumstances, but adds the following requirement:
The (Employment Relations) Board shall declare any
such all-union
agreements terminated whenever it finds that the labor
organisation
SSwd has unreasonably refused to receive as a f^r *ny ^t^l
of such employer, and each such all-union
agreement snail be made sub-
ject to this duty of the Board (Aaron and Komaroff, 1J.
Identical language is used in the Colorado Peace Act.
Six states impose some kind of statutory regulation upon
union initiation
fees, dues, and assessments.
1
The Alaba^ law outlaws collections for work
permits. Colorado prohibits arbitrary or excessive initiation
fees and dues,
^abama, Colorado, Florida, Kansas, Fassachusetts, and Texas.
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as well a3 excessive, unwarranted, arbitrary, or oppressive fines, penalties,
or forfeitures. In Florida, it is unlawful for any person to charge, re-
• ceive or retain any duos, assessments or other charges in excess of, or not
authorized by the constitution or by-laws of any labor organization. Kansas
has identical provisions. The Massachusetts law forbids a labor union to
require any person, as a condition of securing or continuing employment, to
pay any fee or assessment other than that required by the constitution and
by-laws. Violations of this provision are punishable by fine (Aaron and
Konaroff, l). The Texas statute dealing with the subject is nore specific
and detailed than corresponding laws in any other of the states. The no3t
controversial part of the statute, it seems, made it unlawful for any union
or its representatives to make any charges, or to receive money for any
pecuniary exactions, "which will create a fund in excess of the reasonable
requirements of such union, in carrying out its lawful purpose or activities,
if.. .such pecuniary exactions create, or will create an undue hardship on the
applicant for intie.tion...or upon the union members" (Aaron and Komaroff, l).
The trial court ruled, without further elucidation, that this provision contra-
vened "the provisions of the Constitution of the State of Texas and the
Constitution of the United States."1
Eleven states have enacted laws requiring some type of union report on
financial or other internal union affairs.2 The Alabama Labor Act requires
all labor unions who have more than 25 members to file annualy with every
member and with the Department of Labor, a sworn statement containing the
following information: (l) the names and addresses of its officers and business
•^American Federation of Labor v. Mann. Sight C.C.H . Labor Cases . Texas
District Court, 1944, Raragraph 62,009.
^Alabama, Colorado, ELorida, Idaho, Kansas, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
North Dakota, South Dakota, Texas, and Wisconsin.
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agents, together with the salaries and other renumeraticns paid each; (2) the
nane of the union and the location of it3 offices within the state; (3) the
date of the regular election of officers, and the somber of paid-up members;
{/,) a complete financial statement of all fees, dues, fines, and assessments
levied and received during the preceding twelve months; and (5) a complete
statement of all property owned by the union. Violations of the statute are
punishable civilly by fine, and criminally by fine and imprisonment.
The Florida statute provides that every union operating within the state
must make an annual written report to the Secretary of State showing the
name of the union and it3 office location and the names and addresses of the
officers and business agent. This provision was held unconstitutional to the
extent that it is applied to enjoin a labor union from functioning for fail-
ure to comply with the statutory requirement. Lihe Alabama, Texas passed a
law requiring xuiions to submit an annual report covering a number of matters,
inclxiding a financial report of all fee3, dues, fines, and assessments levied
or received during the preceding twelve months. However, this provision wa3
struck out on the ground that it is an unwarranted and unreasonable require-
ment imposing an undue burden upon unions not demanded by the public Interest,
The statutory regulations of union reports enacted by Colorado and Idaho wore
declared unconstitutional for reasons not directly related to these specific
regulations. The Oolorado provisions were held to be "go inseparably inter-
twined \;ith and predicated upon the unconstitutional compulsory union incor-
poration requirement of the labor Beace let they they could not stand with
it. The Idaho statute, which sought to regulate a variety of union activities,
hjS6f S.U. (2d), 276,2S2, Texas Civil Aon., 194-5.
^A.F.L. v. Reilly, 113 Colorado, 90, 100, 155, paragraph (2d), 145-
1944.
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Including picketing, and boycotting, fall afoul a state constitutional
provision that each act must embrace but ono subject, expressed in the title."
The corresponding provisions in the Kansas, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Korth
Dakota, South Dakota, and Wisconsin statutes contain no novel features (Aaron
and Komaroff, l).
Four states have laws regulating the election of union officers and
representatives, those being Colorado, Florida, Minnesota, and Texas. The
most swooping of these is the Minnesota Labor Union Democracy Act. It provides
that no union officers shall be elected for a term exceeding four years, and
that elections of such officers shall be by secret ballot. Reasonable notice
of elections of officers Bust be given to all eligible voters, and no election
is valid unless a plurality of those eligible to vote do so. A union failing
to conform to these requirements is subject to disqualification, in which
event it ray no longer act as the bargaining representative of the employees.
The Florida law declares it to be unlawful for any parson to prevent elections
of labor organisations. And like so many other provisions of the Texas
statute, the one regulating union elections, which required officers to be
elected by majority vote of the members present and participating, has been
2
declared unconstitutional. The relevant provision in the Colorado Labor
Peace Act provided that union officers should be elected annually and by secret
ballot j that any iromber in good standing should be eligible for office on
giving proper notice j and that thirty days' notice of the annual meeting
should be given to all members, together with a list of candidates for office
and an agenda of all other business to come before the meeting. This provision
l&.F.L. v. Langley, 66 Idaho, 763, 168 Paragraph (2d), 831, 19-46.
A.F.L. v, Mann, op. cit..
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was held Invalid because of its clone association with, and dependence upon,
ft, i*a •*ha ccrupul3cry incorporation provision of the statute*
By way of sutrrrary, 26 states have no legislation relating to the regula-
tion cf internal vcrdon affairs. Included in thi3 list aro four of the sost
important industrial states: California, Illinois, Michigan and Ohio, She
eight statos with enfcrcible statutes prohibiting discrimination in ervploy-
rent because of race, creed, color, or national origin, by union, enployers
and enplovraent agencies, have rr^de an effective start toward industrial
denocracy. Yet those laws, while essential, aro not sufficient; other regula-
tions are needed to establish and maintain democracy within labor unions*
Those states which have attempted to regulate the Internal administration
of labor unions have, it seo^s, enacted lavs which offer insufficient protection
to individual employees and, in sons cases, unduly restrict union activities.
Since tho federal law purports to regulate internal union affairs only
indirectly, a vast area is loft open to state regulation; and wliile state
c:>:psrirentaticn in this area seems to be desirable, tho Federal Governtnent
would appear to have an obligation to enact legislation dealing specifically
with the probloin which can serve as a standard of comparison.
^A.P.L. v. Reilly, op, cit...
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SUMMARY OF FINDINGS k'D CONCLUSIONS
The recognition of throe basic rights of individual workera seem to
represent the minimum essentials of an acceptable union denocrac*r
. First
every worker is entitled to participate, either directly or indirectly, in
raking decisions wnieh affect his working life. Second, ho is entitled to
equal treatment with all others governed by the sane union. Finally, he is
entitled to a fair trial on all charges brought against him.
There seem to be at least three co-.pelling reasons why unions should
be democratic. First, a union in collective bargaining acts as the repre-
sentative of every worker within the bargaining unit. The union 1 s power
is the power to govern the working lives of those for when it bargains, and
all governing should be exercised democratically. Second, in the e^rcise
of those ;vowers derived from the Federal Government through the passage of
such laws as the Wagner Act, unions should maintain the sane democratic stand-
ard:: as are required of government itself. Finally, unions should be demo-
cratic because the principal moral justification for their existence is that
they tend to introduce an element of democracy into the government of industry.
This high objective of industrial democracy can be fulfilled only if unions,
which sit at the bargaining table with employers, are themselves democratic.
The Right to Participate
The right to participate in union affairs involves the whole process
by which majority decisions are made. Within this process at least four
elementary rights seem to be crucial: (k) the right to vote; (B) the right
of free political action within the union} (C) the right of free elections
j
and (D) the right to demand an accounting of union affairs.
A3
(A) It can be fairly stated as the general rule that the right to join,
an obvious and necessary preliminary to the right to vote, is complete, and
this right can be defined in terras of the exceptions to thi3 general rule.
Exceptions occur in those cases in Which unior.3 exclude porsons within their
jurisdiction because of race, political beliefs, creed, sex, or because the
union has closed its membership to all workers but a chosen few. A substantial
majority of unions did not exclude workers from membership because of race.
Constitutional provisions denying the right to join because of certain politi-
cal affiliations or beliefs were in effect in a large majority of unions.
Only two unions were found that had constitutional provisions restricting
admission because of creed, and there is little evidence that unions attempted
to enforce such provisions. Most unions did not have provisions denying
membership because of sex. And the practice of closing the union membership
to all but a chosen few wa3 relatively infrequent. The evidence soered to
indicate that the right to vote was complete and protected in a substantial
majority of unions.
(B) The right to vote may be hollow unless the members of the union are
free to engage in political action j that Is, free to debate the policies
of the union, criticise the conduct of the officers, form an organized op-
position and campaign during union elections. However, nearly every consti-
tution contained provisions which might be used to curb the right to free
political action within the union. One-half of the international unions had
constitutional provisions which limited union members ' criticisms of union
officers and fellow members. Free political action within the union appeared
to be seriously limited, at least potentially, by constitutional provisions
or actions of union officers.
(C
)
The right to belong to a union and to engage in political action
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Is enhanced when adequate protection is given to insure free elections. The
right to free elections seems to entail, at least three requirements i (l) each
member is free to vote as he chooses, exemplified by tho secret ballot; (2)
the votes after tho election must bo honestly counted; and (3) qualified
persons elected to positions by the membership nust be allowed to serve, and
not arbitrarily removed, Tliero is a lack of evidence illustrating either
instances of abuse of the right to free elections or protection of this right,
and no judgement can be made as the extent to which unions in general meet
this requirement.
(D) The right to participate does not end in tho voting booth. If issues
have been decided by direct vote, the members have a right to know what steps
are being carried out to enforce those decisions. The members' right to an
accounting of union affairs helps insure that decisions made through the
democratic process are not frustrated, and it also greatly aids the members
in making future choices of policies and leadership. Here again, there is
not enough evidence available to determine tho extent to which unions meet
trie minimum requirements.
In regard to admissions, unions are free and open; concerning free
political action, it is limited, at least potentially, by constitutional!,
provisions or actions of union officers; with respect to free elections, no
judgment can be made a3 to the extent to which unions meet this requirement;
concerning the right to demand an accounting of union affairs, tho evidence
is insufficient to support a judgment as to the extent to \jhich unions meet
tbia requirement; and on net balance, the conclusion must be that 'there is a
substantial lack of evidence to support a judgment as to the extent to which
a majority of U. S. unions protect the right to participate.
15
The Right to Frdr and Equal Treatment
Participation provides self-goveraaent through tha operation of majority
will, but democracy also demands that tba po-.er of ths majority be limited
for the protection of the minority.
It seems the danger of discrimination is cost acute when the union helps
determine who shall bo entitled to the job3 available. Seniority clauses,
although accepted as a valuable part of our industrial pattern, can be nanipu-
latod by the majority to obtain job preference at the expense of the minority.
Discrimination nay be subtle and take many forms. In one instance, \jhen
two companies consolidated, the employees of the larger company used their
majority control to place the employees of the smaller company at the bottom
of the seniority list. In another case, a union obtained a retroactive wage
increase tased on inequities in job classification, When it -was discovered
that the bulk of the back pay would go to a relatively snail group of employees,
the majority voted that the total amount should be divided equally among all
employees. In many situations it is hard to determine whether the union has
acted in good faith or Whether it has deliberately bartered away the rights
of the minority in order to obtain gains for the majority.
Concern ha3 been mostly with why unions should provide fair and equal
treatment and very little with whether or not they have. There is not e-
nough evidence available to reach a judgment on the extant to which a majority
of U. 3. unions have net thi3 requirement.
The Right to a Fair Trial
Unions have established trials and appeals to compel obedience or to
impose punishment if members are found guilty of violating their obligations.
The trial hearing is normally held by a trial committee which reports its
A6
fiudlUga and recanriendations to the local for approval; 106 unions have
provisions for such a trial corrittee. In 46 unions, the elected officers
act a3 the hearing body; 5 unions provide for a permanent committee which
shall hear all cases during its term of office j and 55 unions provide for
the naming of a temporary committee to hear each case as it ari3e3.
Although the right of the defendant to hear the evidence against him-
self and to cross examine witnesses is implicit in the more general provisions
of union constitutions, only 22 unions explicitly give thia right. Nine
unions require that the trial shall be a closed hearing, but the Locomotive
Engineers provide that the trial shall be held at the union meeting, vith
the trial committee sitting as Jury. The constitutions uniformally provide
that if the accused fails to appear for the hearing, without a reasonable
excuse, the trial may procede in Ms absence.
The procedure at the ratification stage usually consists of a presentation
of findings of the committee, with a summary of the evidence on xihich it is
based; 15 unions provide at this stage that the accused shall have an op-
portunity to present arguments in his behalf denying his guilt or justifying
his conduct; but three unions prohibit any argument or debate on the trial
committee's recommendations, and require that the local shall immediately
vote. In a majority of unions, guilt is determined by a simple majority vote.
Only 17 unions require as much as a two-thirds vote on the question of guilt,
but 16 others require at least a two-thirds vote before a member can be
expelled.
The great importance which union officials normally place on the constitu-
tion as a guide in difficult situations, and the danger of being rebuked on
appeal, tend to keep abuses of trial procedure at a minimum. In a study of
m228 reported trial cases, no procedural defect wa3 claimed in 42 of these
cases. In 37 others, in which defects were claimed, the court ruled that
the defect was not substantial. In only 73 cases did the court indicate
that there was sufficient defect to amount to a denial of a fair trial.
?hia relatively snail proportion of mistrials in the most questionable cases
seeruj to indicate that union practices were, on the whole, reasonably fair.
Federal and State Regulation
The promotion of democratic procedures in unions through the regulation
of internal union affairs by the several states and the Itederal Government
seems to leave something to be desired. The Taft-Hartley Act protects the
individual worker's right to work, but not his right to participate in union
affairs. Jnrts of the Act have no apparent effect on the policies of union3
which do not possess unicn-security agreements. The Act ha3 no effect on
arbitrary restrictions upon adnis3ion to union membership and undemocratic
e;cpul3ions of union members where the direct effect or result is not loss
of employment. Two area which the Taft-Hartley Act neglected are union trial
procedures and union elections.
On the other hand, the Taft-Hartley Act prohibits discrimination against
an employee who is not a member of a union. If the union possesses a unicn-
security agreerrsnt, the Act protects the tmion member against excessive
initiation foes. One other requirement of the Act is that unions must give
an accounting of their financial affairs and those reports must be furnished
to the union members.
Several states have taken action to promote democratic procedures in
labcr unions. Sixteen states have regulations relating to admissions, dis-
cipline or activities of union members. Twelve of these states have regulations
1
4-8
designed to prevent discrimination ±a WBplojpnent based upon race, creed, color,
or national origin. The regulation of excessive initiation flees, dues, and
assessments is imposed by six states; eleven require some type of union reports
on financial and other internal union affairs; and four 3tate3 have lavs
regulating the election of union officers.
One of the first steps toward promoting democratic procedures in labor
unions vould be for the states which do not have regulations similar to the
typos discussed above, to enact such legislation. Additional regulations are
needed in the area of fair trials for union members
,
The evidence clearly indicates that unions are rioting the right to vote
and the right to a fair trial; on the other requirements the evidence is not
sufficient to support a judgment. Jtorc study is reeded; particularly in the
areas of political action and elections within the union, as well as in
respect to the problem of fair and equal treatment of union rembors.
A9
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Although there are many articles written on the subject of union
democracy, there seems to be no consensus of opinion on what this" "demo-
cracy" in labor unions is supposed to entail. It is the purpose of this
report to attempt to determine the ndntaam requirements of an acceptable union
"democracy," and then to attempt to determine whether the multitudinous studies
of this question have been sufficiently exhaustive, and have ranged the fieH
of U. S. unions sufficiently, to support a definitive judgment as to whether
the majority of unions either are or are not "democratic."
Very few studies since the passage of the Labor Management Relations
Act of 1947 have attempted a comprehensive assessment of the changes in
internal union government occasioned by the Act. Such a study i3 certainly
warranted, but it i3 outside the scops of the present effort, vhich ia concerned
trith pre-194-7 union "democracy."
The recognition of three basic rights of individual workers seems to
represent the minimum essential of an acceptable union democracy, first,
every worker is entitled to participate, directly or indirectly, in making
decisions which affect him. Second, he is entitled to equal treatment with
all others governed by the union. And third, he is entitled to a fair trial
on all charges brought against him.
There seem to be at least three compelling reasons why unions should
be democratic. Hrst, a union in collective bargaining acts as the repre-
sentative of every worker within the bargaining unitj the union has the
power to govern the working lives of those for whom it bargains, and all
governing should be exercised democratically. Second, in the exercise of
those powers derived from the federal government through the passage of such
laws as the Wagner Act, unions should maintain the same democratic standards
which are required of government itself. Finally, unions should be democratic
because the principal moral justification for their existence is that they
tond to introduce an element of democracy into the government of industry.
This high objective of industrial democracy can be fulfilled only if unions
are thenselves democratic.
The right to participate in union affairs involves the whole process
by which majority decisions are made. Within this process at least four
elementary rights seen to be crucial: the right to vote; the right of political
action within the union; tha right of free elections; and the right to demand
an accounting of union affairs. It can be fairly stated as the general rule
that the right to vote was co-jplete and protected in a substantial majority
of unions. Moreover, the right to vote nay be hollow unless the members of
the union are free to engage In political action. Tha evidence appeared to
indicate that free political action within the union was seriously limited,
at least potentially, by constitutional provisions or by the coercive actions
of union officials. The right to engage in political action is enhanced when
adequate protection i3 given to insure free elections. However there is a
definite lack of evidence illustrating either Instances of abuse of the right
of free elections or the protection of this right; and no judgment can be
made on the extent to which unions protected this requirement. The right to
participate does not end in the voting booth; if issues have been decided
by direct vote, the members have the right to know what steps are being
carried out to enforce those decisions. Here again, there i3 not enough
evidence available to determine the extent to which unions meet the minimum
required standards.
In view of the lack of evidence, no judgment can be made on the extent
to which a majority of unions protect the union members' right to a fair and
equal treatment.
The third minimum essential of an acceptable union democracy was the
right to a fair trial. The evidence seemed to indicate that union practices
in trial procedures were, on the whole, reasonably fair.
Federal and otato regulation of internal union affairs seems to leave
something to bo desired. The Taft-IIarley Act protects the individual
worker's right to work, but not his right to participate in union affairs.
Parts of the Act have no apparent effect on the policies of unions which
neither possess nor desire to possess un* on-security agreements. For example,
if employees are covered by a union-security agreeirent, it is an unfair labor
practice for a union to require initiation fees which the National Labor
Relations Board finds "excessive." The Taft-Hartley Act does require the
union to provide an accounting of its internal affairs.
Several states have taken action to increase the democratic procedures
in labor unions. There is a vast area open to state regulation of internal
tuiicn affairs. State experimentation in this area seems desirable; but it
would appear that the Federal Government has an obligation to enact a law
dealing specifically with the problem which might serve as a standard of
comparison.
The evidence clearly indicates that unions are meeting the right to
vote and the right to a fair trialj on the other requirements the evidence
is not sufficient to support a judgment. More study is needed particularly
in the areas of political action and elections within the union as well. as
in respect to the problem of fair and equal treatment among all union members.
